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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Federal

5th Circuit

2d Circuit

Cazamias v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., No. 1640214, 2016 WL 4784029 (5th Cir. Sept. 13, 2016).

Petroterminal De Panama v. Houston Casualty Co., 152941-cv, 2016 WL 4703898 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2016).

Non-operators in two oil and gas leases brought
an action in state court against the operator seeking
damages and declaratory relief. The non-operator
argued that the operator did not adhere to the joint
operating agreement (“JOA”) after unsuccessful
development without prompt plugging of a gas well
no longer in operation. The operator removed the
case to federal court on basis of diversity jurisdiction
and counterclaimed against the non-operators under
the state’s Natural Resources Code (“SNRC”) to
recover plugging costs and moved for summary
judgment on the non-operators’ claims and the
counterclaim. The operator argued it was not subject
to the JOA because the lease to which the JOA was
applicable expired before the operator assumed
control such that its obligations to plug the well were
statutory and not contractual, and the court agreed.
On appeal, the district court affirmed on two points:
First, the operator was not subject to the JOA because
the lease expired before the operator assumed
control. Second, the operator proved it paid for
plugging costs but the non-operators had yet to
reimburse the operator, making the non-operators
liable under the SNRC.

An insured party transported and stored oil in
Panama. There, a pipeline failure caused an oil spill,
and certain parties sued Insured and a firm that stored
oil with the insured. To secure jurisdiction over the
firm—a Swiss company—the Panamanian court issued
an attachment of the firm’s oil. The firm later sued the
Insured in New York for consequential damages
associated with the spill and judicial attachment. The
court found that the foreign court’s attachment
amounted to a force majeure, relieving the insured of
liability to the firm. The insured then filed this action
against its insurer to collect costs incurred in defending
the firm’s suit. Because the marine liability policies
imposed a duty to indemnify—rather than defend—the
insurer was only liable for the insured’s defense costs if
the policies covered the firm’s claims. And because the
attachment of the firm’s oil fell squarely within the
policies’ exclusion provisions, the court affirmed the
trial court and held that the insurers had no duty to
reimburse the insured its defense costs.
3d Circuit
Pollock v. Energy Corp. of Am., No. 15-2648, 2016 WL
6156313 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2016).

10th Circuit
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell,
839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016).

An energy corporation appealed a jury verdict
alleging not enough evidence existed for the jury to find
that the energy corporation breached its mineral leases
with the lessor class action group by improperly
deducting marketing and transportation costs from
royalty payments. Although evidence of contracts for
sale of natural gas existed requiring the buyer pay for
the cost of marketing and transportation, the appeals
court held that the lessors paid a one-eighth percentage
of the marketing and transportation costs based on
testimony of the energy corporation’s executive. Thus,
the court found ample evidence to support the jury
verdict and affirmed district court ruling in favor of the
lessors.

An environmental group sued BLM under
NEPA, challenging numerous drilling permits in the
San Juan Basin. The group argued that prolific
horizontal drilling and multi-stage fracing presented
environmental risks for which BLM’s outdated
resource plan did not account. The group also moved
for a preliminary injunction to prevent drilling while
the suit was pending. Although the group showed
irreparable harm, the trial court denied its motion
because the group failed to prove the other required
elements for a preliminary injunction. The court of
appeals—affirming the trial court on narrow
grounds—addressed only the “substantial likelihood
of success on the merits” prong of the test. First, the
court determined that the trial court applied the
proper test for “substantial likelihood” considering
Supreme Court case law. Further, even if the
proposed drilling was different in kind from past
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methods, the amount of activity and related surface
impacts were within BLM’s anticipated levels. Finally,
the group’s other arguments were not sufficiently
developed to prove “substantial likelihood of success
on the merits” under the agency-deferential standard of
review. The court noted that because of the case’s
interlocutory posture, the decision on the group’s
motion would not preclude an ultimate judgment in the
group’s favor.

the court to revoke the refund. The ARRA calls for a
refund of thirty percent of the cost basis for solar
energy property. The company’s solar energy
systems and the cost of their installation undoubtedly
qualify for a refund under ARRA; the amount owed,
however, was thirty percent of the total cost basis
with profit—the original amount given by the
Treasury, not the amount requested by the company.
Furthermore, the court found the Treasury’s
allegations of fraud “completely unfounded” by the
court, viewing the company’s owners as highly
credible businessmen without college degrees and
unlikely to plot such a complex scheme of fraud. The
Treasury’s allowance of the full amount on the first
installation led to the reasonable belief that the
Treasury should reimburse the company.

U.S. Energy Dev. Corp. v. Stephens Energy Grp., LLC,
No. 15-6188, 15-6215, 2016 WL 5210888 (10th Cir.
Sept. 21, 2016).
Producer A executed a participation agreement
(“PA”) with Producers B and C under which B and C
agreed to join A in the development of certain lands. A
separate joint operating agreement (“JOA”) governed
the drilling, but both agreements named Producer C as
operator. Later, Producer C sold D all its rights, title,
and interests in the lands. Consistent with the PA,
Producer C filed a form with the state regulatory
commission to assign its operator status to D. Producer
A argued that C’s assignment triggered the JOA’s
resignation provision, requiring that the parties elect a
new operator by majority vote. Producers A and B
elected A and sought an injunction and declaration
against D. The trial court concluded that the JOA
outlined the terms for changing operators and, giving
effect to those provisions, ruled for Producers A and B.
The court of appeals reversed. Under relevant case law,
the court presumed that contractual rights and duties are
assignable. Moreover, the PA’s language made “rights,
duties, and obligations”—and therefore operator
status—assignable. Because the parties expressly
agreed that the PA controlled conflicts between the two
writings, the court reversed. It noted that although the
JOA controlled operator status in some circumstances,
it did not render operator status unassignable under the
PA.

State
Louisiana
Stephenson v. Wildcat Midstream Caddo, LLC, No.
50,982–CA, 2016 WL 6649228 (La Ct. App. Nov.
10, 2016).
Purported landowners (“Purported Owners”) of a
three-acre strip containing a pipeline brought an
action against the pipeline owner (“Pipeline”) for
injunctive relief and money damages. The Pipeline
bought a right-of-way agreement from a neighbor
adjacent to the landowners to build on that strip. The
trial court dismissed the Purported Owners’ action,
and they appealed. The appellate court relied on the
State Civil Code (“SCC”) to determine that the
Purported Owners’ did not meet their burden of
proof. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision for two reasons: First, the strip was
susceptible to acquisitive prescription, and the
quitclaim deed conveyance of the strip to the
neighbor was just title making applicable the
acquisitive prescriptions requirements of the SCC.
Second, evidence did not suggest that the neighbor
did not exercise a good faith possession; rather it
constructed a fence that enclosed the strip and paid
property taxes on the strip. Owners knew of these
events but did not dispute the boundary lines until
eighteen years later.

Court of Federal Claims
LCM Energy Solutions v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl.
728 (Fed. Cl. 2016).
A solar power installation company used benefits
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) to install solar panel systems without
collecting payment from customers and profiting from
the government stimulus for renewable energy systems.
The Treasury Department fully refunded the first
installation for retail installation price. After several
more installations, the Treasury reimbursed $482,504 of
its requested $889,638, so the company sued for the
rest. Treasury countersued with claims of fraud, asking

XXI Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 2016269, 2016 WL 5404650 (La. App. 3 Cir. Sept. 28,
2016), reh'g denied (Nov. 9, 2016).
An operator recompleted a well on a unit owned
by the State of Louisiana, though it did not hold a
lease. A lessee acquired a lease covering the unit and
sued the operator for failure to provide the quarterly
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accounting of costs required under La.R.S. 30:103.1 (“§
103.1”). The operator filed an exception of no cause of
action claiming the statute did not apply to the lessee,
which the trial court denied. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the lessee, and
the operator appealed, but the appellate court affirmed
the judgement and held monetary penalties were the
appropriate remedy under La.R.S 30:103.2 (“§103.2”).
The trial court entered judgement against the operator,
and the operator again appealed, arguing that §§ 103.1
and 103.2 do not apply to lessees and maintaining that
the required accounting of costs for “drilling
operations” under § 103.2 does not include postproduction costs. On appeal, the court affirmed, first
maintaining that a mineral lessee may demand an
accounting from an operator or producer working on
the property covered by the lease. Next, it held that
“drilling operations” under § 103.2 include postproduction costs because the term is clear when read in
conjunction with § 103.1; there would otherwise be “no
incentive for the operator or producer to provide the
quarterly reports” under the § 103.1. Finally, the Court
held that Operator had no standing to challenge the
validity of the leases in such a case under the doctrine
of “personal right,” finding that a party cannot demand
performance of an obligation in the “absence of an
assignment or subrogation.”

New Jersey
In re Petition of S. Jersey Gas Co., 149 A.3d 13
(App. Div. 2016).
A gas company planned to construct a natural
gas pipeline through the New Jersey Pinelands Forest
Area and applied to the Pinelands Commission
(“Commission”) for a permit, contingent upon a
determination that the project complied with the
Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan
(“CMP”). The Company also petitioned the Board of
Public Utilities (“Board”) for a waiver of Municipal
Land Use Laws (“MLUL”). The Commission
determined the project did not meet CMP
requirements and denied the application. The
Commission’s Executive Director (“Director”)
approved a second amended application. Therefore,
the Board granted the Company’s MLUL petition.
Environmental groups appealed, claiming that the
Director lacked authority to find CMP compliance
and that the Board lacked authority approve of the
MLUL petition. On appeal, the Superior Court of
New Jersey held that the failure of the first
application did not divest the Commission of its
authority to review the amended application or the
Board of its jurisdiction to review the MLUL petition
since the amended application and resulting
determination by the Director were a separate matter.
However, the Court found that the Board lacked
authority to approve Company’s MLUL petition, as
such a decision was contingent upon CMP
compliance. The Court found that determinations of
CMP compliance, including a review of
determinations issued by the Director, fall under the
authority of the Commission. The Court remanded
the Director’s determination of the project’s CMP
compliance to the Commission for review and
instructed the Board to issue a modified order
conditioning approval of the Company’s MLUL
petition upon a final determination of CMP
compliance by the Commission.

Montana
Carbon Cty. Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas
Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016).
The county’s council challenged the state board’s
approval of an operator’s request to conduct diagnostic
fracture injection tests. The council claimed the board
denied it a “meaningful opportunity to participate” in
the permit process in violation of the state constitution.
Initially, the operator submitted a proposal to drill an
exploratory well, and the board organized a public
hearing when the council objected. Although the
proposal did not mention fracing, residents testified
regarding the council’s opposition to fracing at the site.
The board nonetheless granted the operator’s permit.
Later—and without another hearing—the board
approved the operator’s request concerning the
diagnostic tests. The council argued that this amounted
to an expansion of the permit’s original scope because
drilling permits allow such tests. The court sided with
the board, which argued that the board had not
expanded the permit’s scope. And because the tests did
not amount to fracing, the court held that the council
“meaningfully participated” in the board’s approval of
the operator’s diagnostic tests.

Ohio
Corban v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., No. 2014-0804,
2016 WL 4887428 (Ohio 2016).
A federal court certified two question to the Ohio
Supreme Court regarding dormant mineral rights:
First, which version of the state law regarding
dormant minerals applies regarding the automatic
divestiture to the surface owner in the event of
abandonment? And second is the payment of delay
rentals during the primary term a title transaction and
a saving event under state law? For the first question,
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the court found that the dormant mineral estate does not
automatically pass by operation of law to the surface
owner; the surface owner must follow the statutory
provisions to rejoin the severed estate. Second, a delay
rental payment constitutes neither a title transaction nor
a savings event under state law.

Oklahoma
Scott v. Peters, No. 114,913, 2016 WL 6216169
(Okla. Oct. 25, 2016).
A grantor brought action against a grantee
alleging that he had intended to transfer the surface
only and retain the mineral interest in the property.
The grantor had executed a warranty deed conveying
120 acres to the grantee. Three years later, the grantor
conveyed surface rights of another 40 acres to the
grantee by warranty deed. Although filed with the
county clerk, the grantor did not retain any mineral
rights in this 40-acre deed. Approximately eight
months later, the grantor conveyed the same real
property to a housing developer by warranty deed
that also made no reference reserving mineral
interests. The developer then conveyed the same
property to a trust, also with no reference to mineral
rights. The grantee obtained a quit-claim deed from
the trust to clear title of all 160 acres for a mortgage
on the property. The grantee leased those 160 acres to
a land company. More than fourteen years later, the
grantor filed quiet title action against the grantee for
the mineral interests in and under the 160 acres. The
grantee counterclaimed for slander of title. The
grantee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that the lawsuit was untimely. The trial court granted
the grantee’s summary judgment motion. On appeal,
the state supreme court affirmed because the statute
of limitations began to accrue when the grantor filed
the initial deed excluding mineral reservations.

Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 2015-0545,
2016 WL 6519011 (Ohio Nov. 2, 2016).
A federal court submitted the following certified
question to the Ohio Supreme Court: Does Ohio follow
the “at the well” rule or the “marketable product” rule?
The case arose from a class action suit against a lessee
for the underpayment of mineral royalties to the lessors.
The court held that since the oil and gas lease in Ohio is
a contract, that traditional rules of contract
interpretation apply, and therefore declined to answer
the question. Two justices dissented each arguing
differing answers to the certified question. One justice
uses policy based arguments to support the argument
that Ohio follows the “marketable product” rule. The
justice in support of the “at the well” rule looks to Ohio
case law regarding the implied covenant to reasonable
development.
Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, No. 2014-0803, 2016 WL
4908778 (Ohio Sept. 15, 2016).
Under Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act (“ODMA”),
severed mineral rights merge with surface rights. Under
the 1989 version of the ODMA, the mineral rights
would automatically merge without any filings or
proceedings by the surface owner or the mineral owner
once deemed “abandoned.” The 2006 version of the
ODMA, however, requires that the surface owner file
an Affidavit of Abandonment of Mineral Interest and
send a copy to the mineral owner who then has 60 days
to respond to keep the mineral interest from merging
with the surface rights. The property at question had its
surface and mineral rights severed in 1965. In 2012, the
surface owner claimed that the 1989 ODMA
automatically merged the two interests. The mineral
owner claimed that the 2006 ODMA applied and his
timely response kept his property from the abandoned
classification. The court ruled that under Corban v.
Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, No. 2014-0804, 2016
WL 4887428, the 1989 ODMA is not self-executing so
the 2006 ODMA applies to any claim brought after
2006, giving mineral owners the opportunity to retain
their interests in the property. The surface owners filed
a petition for certiorari in December 2016.

Pennsylvania
Birdie Assocs, L.P. v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, 2016 PA
Super 228 (Pa. Super. Oct. 20, 2016).
Landowners leased to a coal mining company the
right to mine for “coal and its constituent products”
on roughly 300 acres of land. The agreement was for
a monthly royalty and a tonnage royalty off coal
sales. The coal mining company never actually sold
any coal and even stated that it was not its intention
to mine the coal. Instead, the company sold the coal
bed methane gas (“CBM”) from the mine without
paying any CBM royalty to the landowners.
Landowners sued claiming that the coal company
owed them royalty on the CBM pursuant to a statute
granting landowners a royalty on gas sold from their
land. Pennsylvania law, however, established that
when a landowner leases the right to mine for coal
and its constituent products, the landowner “sells” the
coal and its constituent products to the coal mining
company. Under this doctrine, the coal mining
company had already purchased the coal and the
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CBM, so it owed no royalty to the landowners on the
sale of CBM.

this benefit. Second, the owner claimed that the
operator wrongly deducted marketing costs from its
share based on the cost of operating certain
compressors. Under the agreement, the operator
could only deduct such costs if the compressors were
“downstream from a central facility.” Because the
owner proved as a matter of law that the compressors
were not downstream, the court held that operator
had breached the agreement and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment for the owner.

Texas
Greer v. Shook, No. 08-15-00040-CV, 2016 WL
6092963 (Tex. App. Oct. 19, 2016).
A property owner (“Grantor”) leased his minerals
retaining a one-eighth royalty in the production. The
Grantor then deeded an undivided one-sixteenth interest
in all minerals to a Grantee but “covers and includes
[one-half] of all of the oil royalty” due under the first
lease “[a]nd it shall never be necessary for said grantee
or his assigns to join I the execution of any future leases
made on said lands.” Successors of both the Grantor
and Grantee (collectively “Successors”) agree the lease
expired, and the Grantor’s successors entered a new
lease with the Operator that filed this suit asserting the
deed was ambiguous: it was uncertain whether the
Grantee’s successors owned (1) one-sixteenth of the
production in any lease on the property regardless of
the royalty set by the lease or (2) half of the royalty
interest set by the terms of the lease. Successors filed
cross-claims seeking declaratory relief and motions for
summary judgment. A party holding a royalty without
owning the mineral interest is a non-participating
royalty holder; parties can express this type of interest
as a fraction of the total royalty or as a floating royalty
(varying with the size of the landowner’s royalty).
Based on the “four corners” approach, the court viewed
these seemingly conflicting fractions in the only way
that would reconcile the two: the Grantor’s intent must
have been a permanent one-half mineral interest. This
also supports the “legacy of the one-eighth royalty”—
the standard royalty in all lease agreements at the time
of the lease in question.

Richardson v. Mills, No. 12-15-00170-CV, 2016 WL
7488860 (Tex. App., Dec. 30, 2016).
Appellants appealed the trial court decision in
favor of the Appellees, determining they own a onehalf interest in the oil, gas, and other minerals
described in two instruments. The appellate court
reviewed the two instruments. Appellants argued that
the first instrument constituted an unambiguous
mineral deed to Appellants rather than a lease as
ruled by the trial court. The appellate court agreed.
Appellants argue that the second instrument refers to
an unrecorded oil and gas lease, whereas the
Appellees state that the second instrument refers to
the first instrument, the mineral deed. Appellees
argue that the second instrument contains a “latent
ambiguity” which allows for the use of extrinsic
evidence to prove the intent of the parties. The
appellate court disagreed and ruled the second
instrument to be unambiguous; therefore, extrinsic
evidence was inadmissible. The appellate court
rejected Appellants claim to review a stipulation
made granting an undivided 4.1666% of the disputed
mineral interest. Thus, the Appellees hold no interest
in the oil, gas and other minerals in the described
property, save the stipulated 4.1666%.

HighMountain Expl. & Prod. LLC v. Harrison Ints.,
Ltd., NO. 14-15-00058-CV, 2016 WL 5853302 (Tex.
App.—Houston 14th Dist. Oct. 6, 2016).

Shell W. E & P, Inc. v. Pel-State Bulk Plant, LLC,
No. 04-15-00750-CV, 2016 WL 6247007, (Tex. App.
Oct. 26, 2016).

Following its reservation of an NPRI in certain real
property, a royalty owner executed a royalty agreement
with the operator’s predecessor in interest. A dispute
arose concerning the interpretation of two provisions.
First, the owner claimed that the operator improperly
withheld the owner’s share of “gross proceeds” from
gas produced and used as fuel for the operator’s
equipment. The agreement defined “gross proceeds” as
“the entire economic benefit” the operator received
from such production. In affirming the trial court’s
judgment for the owner, the court of appeals reasoned
that the operator’s benefit was not having to purchase
fuel elsewhere. And contrary to the operator’s assertion,
the record clearly showed it was possible to quantify

An oil company appealed a $3 million judgment
against it from an oil field services sub-contractor.
The oil company hired a contractor to perform
fracking services on a 106,000-acre mineral lease in
Texas. The contractor then hired a subcontractor to
provide fuel and other services in the exploration of
the lease. The sub-contractor sent a lien claim notice
to the oil company, which informed it that the
contractor was not paying for the work on the lease.
The sub-contractor later perfected a mineral lien and
eventually sued the oil company and the contractor
for the unpaid amount. The contractor filed for
bankruptcy, and the oil company sold its interests on

570
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol2/iss5/7

the lease. On appeal, the oil company argued that the
sub-contractor should not be granted the cumulative
sum of the contracts between the oil company and the
contractor and instead should only be awarded the sum
of contracts where the sub-contractor provided services.
The appeals court affirmed and held that the subsequent
agreements between the oil company and the contractor
were all part of one contract because there was no
language in the fracking agreement to support that each
well agreement or work order was a separate contract.
The oil company also argued that under Texas law, the
oil company could only be liable for the amount the oil
company owed to the subcontractor on the lien notice
date. The appeals court held that because the dealings

between the oil company and the contractor were part
of one contract and the oil company owed $10
million to the contractor at the time of the lien notice,
the sub-contractor could recover the $3.2 million
from the oil company.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal

the court held that Department properly determined
that water

9th Circuit
would be “continuously, legally and physically
available” for the company’s operation. Next, the
court stated that while the Department need not
“specifically quantify” BLM’s water rights, it must
“consider” BLM’s rights in regulating designations.
Finally, the court held that the Department need not
separately evaluate the impact of pumping on the
nearby conservation area.

Sierra Club v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 840 F.3d
1106 (9th Cir. 2016).
An environmental group challenged the
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) accompanying
an agency’s regional plan update (“Plan”) for the Lake
Tahoe Region. The agency developed the Plan—which
restricts development in the region—over more than a
decade,
incorporating
recommendations
from
concerned citizens and local governments. The group
primarily complained that the Plan inadequately
addressed local effects of runoff, which it believed
threatened the lake’s superior water quality. The trial
court granted the agency’s motion for summary
judgment, and the group appealed. In affirming, the
court of appeals concluded that the EIS analysis of the
effects of future development was not “arbitrary or
capricious” and adequately addressed the Plan’s
impacts. It also held that substantial evidence support
the EIS assumption concerning best management
practices—which aim to prevent pollutants from
entering the water—even though the agency had
struggled to enforce such practices in the past.

Montana
Granite Cty. Bd. of Commissioners v. McDonald, 383
P.3d 740 (Mont. 2016).
A farmer downstream of a hydroelectric dam
operated by the county sued the county for failing to
release the water required for him to irrigate his
crops. The county claimed the creek was merely low
and no water could pass through the dam. Applying
the Schuh Decree—which held that downstream
users have the right to the natural flow of the stream,
nothing more—the county argued the creek would
naturally have periods of reduced water. But the
farmer argued that the county should maintain the
average natural flow because it was responsible for
releasing water at a set rate. The court sided with the
county, stating that a downstream claimant only has a
right to the water that flows into the dam, not the
water held within the dam.

State
Arizona
Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co., 384 P.3d 814 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2016).

New Mexico

A private water company sought a water supply
designation, which would allow it to supply water to a
planned residential development. BLM filed an
objection, asserting that the company failed to consider
BLM’s existing claim to water about a nearby
conservation area. BLM could not quantify its right to
water; the extent of its claim remained uncertain,
pending the conclusion of an ongoing suit between
numerous claimants. The Department of Water
Resources (“Department”) denied BLM’s objection,
concluding that the company’s application satisfied the
designation requirements. BLM appealed, and an ALJ
found that BLM failed to show the Department’s
decision was contrary to law. BLM then filed a
complaint in state court. The trial court vacated the
ALJ’s decision, concluding that the Department must
consider existing legal claims in evaluating water
supply availability for designations. On review, the
court of appeals vacated the trial court’s decision. First,

State Eng'r of New Mexico v. Diamond K Bar Ranch,
LLC, 385 P.3d 626 (N.M. 2016).
Farmers sought to dismiss the state engineer’s
complaint over the farmers use of appropriated water
to irrigate farmland that was not part of the permitted
water right. The farmers argued that the state
engineer did not have statutory authority over the
diverted water because the diversion began in
Colorado and flowed into New Mexico through a
ditch. The farmers also argued permits were
unnecessary because the ditch was in existence
before a state water appropriation law. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico held the State Engineer did
have jurisdiction to enjoin the farmers from using the
water from the ditch on farmland outside the area of
the ditch because the State Engineer could apply for
an injunction against anyone for unlawful use or
water diversion without a legal right to do so. The
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farmers argued that the water used came from a manmade ditch so the waters are private and the State
Engineer cannot regulate a private water way. The court
held that no water within New Mexico is private and
that users only have a right to use a certain amount of
water for beneficial use. The court held that the ditch
was a community ditch, which did not require the
farmers to acquire a permit to use the water on
appurtenant land. However, the court held that for the
farmers to use the water on land that was not
appurtenant the farmers, they must file for a permit with
the State Engineer.

flood was not enough for a required taking, but the
court has shown several times that multiple flooding
events are important evidence for proof but are not a
pleadings requirement. The court only decided on the
pleadings, and for those purposes, the homeowners
have provided enough to meet the lower standard of
proof for pleas, even with skepticism of their ability
to meet the substantial evidentiary burden in court.
Virginia
TransCanada Hydro Ne.
Rockingham, 2016 VT 100.

Inc.

v.

Town

of

South Carolina
A privately owned hydroelectric power plant
(“Taxpayer”) challenged the property valuation by a
municipality (“Town”) at about $108 million. The
Taxpayer’s expert witness, an engineer, used an
income-based discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis
to determine an $84 million fair market value. The
Town’s expert, an appraiser, also used a DCF method
along with a comparable sales approach, and taking
both into account came to a value of $130 million
and $108.5 million attributable to the Town. The
experts differed in areas such as the number of years
used for average power (and income) generation and
equity rates. The rejection of the taxpayer’s witness’s
uncommon approach by the court and its reliance on
the accepted methods and explanations provided by
the Town’s witness were within the court’s
discretion. The Taxpayer claimed the Town’s
valuation did not account for adjustments in its
comparable sales analysis, but the Town’s expert
accounted for the plant’s location, taxpayer’s control
of the river system, ability to sell into multiple
markets, high overhead, facility conditions, and on
and off-peak generation when adjusting twelve
similar market sales. The court upheld all decisions to
rely on the Town’s witness except the comparable
sales, which were only offers of sales and never
completed, and adjusted the price to $127.4 million.

Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., No. 2013001477, 2016 WL 6520167 (S.C., Nov. 2, 2016).
A landowner sued for trespass and unjust
enrichment against two separate utility companies for
their use of his land for water and power lines. The trial
court granted summary judgement in favor of the utility
companies, which the appellate court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina first clarified the elements of a “perspective
easement.” The court noted that the terms “adverse use”
and “claim of right” do not constitute separate options
to prove perspective easement; rather, these terms are
the same. The court, therefore, determined that a
genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether the
water utility’s use of the landowner’s groundwater was
open and notorious because the water was underground,
bushes hid the meter, and the location of the water main
was not widely known, precluding summary judgment
on utility’s claim for prescriptive easement. The court
affirmed the prescriptive easement for the distribution
line at the point it crossed the landowner’s property,
however, because utility supervisors indicated that the
line operated for thirty years without interruption and
was visible from the road.
Texas

Washington
City of Socorro v. Campos, No. 08-14-00295-CV, 2016
WL 4801600 (Tex. App. 2016).

Center for Envtl. Law v. Washington Dep’t of
Ecology, 383 P.3d 608 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016)

When a new subdivision built in a natural flood
zone flooded, the city built several drainage channels to
divert water away from the neighborhood. The channels
instead brought the flood waters to another
neighborhood that had never flooded before, and its
residents were denied flood insurance for not being in a
“flood prone” area. The new channels resulted in one to
three feet of flooding, and the homeowners sued the
city under the state takings clause and for nuisance. The
city asked for dismissal of the claim contending one

An environmental group appealed the
government agency’s approval of a hydroelectric
dam, claiming the government agency erred in
approving the project without studies. The court
looked to state law regarding the flow requirements
for hydroelectric projects and found that, for the
environmental group to overturn the approval of the
project, it had the burden of demonstrating that
approval violates the state mandated minimum flow
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requirements—a burden the group failed to meet. The
agency properly followed state law in exercising their
ability to approve projects. Additionally, the agency did

not abuse discretion in not waiting to approve the
project before a final determination of the study.
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SELECTED WIND DECISIONS
State

over the “customer-generator” question or,
alternatively, had primary jurisdiction such that the

Montana
court should defer to it before deciding the other
claims. The court disagreed with both arguments,
reasoning that statutory construction is a matter for the
courts. Moreover, the Commission had no authority to
resolve matters arising under the Act—the legislature
had not given it that power. Finally, the court stated
that jurisdiction with Commission was not necessary
to preserve consistent interpretation of the Act.
Commission’s expertise, the court concluded, “is not a
talisman dissolving a court’s jurisdiction.”

NorthWestern Corp. v. Montana Dep't of Pub. Serv.
Regulation, Montana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 380 P.3d
787 (Mont. 2016).
An electric company appealed the decision of the
Public Service Commissioner (“Commissioner”) that
the electric company failed to act prudently in their
risk management practices. Montana law allows a
utility company to increase rates to cover unexpected
costs of doing business if approved by the
Commissioner. When the electric company built a new
system that required ramping up energy production
with turbines, the company insured its equipment but
did not insure the costs of purchasing energy if
production machines broke down. The turbines did
break down, and the company began purchasing
energy, resulting in nearly $1.5 million of unexpected
expenses. The Commissioner did not allow the
company to recover this cost through increased rates.
On appeal, the court agreed with the Commissioner
that the company was not prudent in their risk
management as they failed to inquire about additional
insurance for the cost of purchasing energy. A
company does not have to purchase insurance to be
prudent, but it must research insuring that risk.

Texas
North Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins, 501 S.W.3d
598 (Tex. 2016).
An energy company entered an option agreement
with landowners to lease multiple parcels of land,
paying per acre. The described land is “1210.8224
acres of land, more or less, out of the 1673.69 acres”
in an attachment referencing another lease. The
referenced lease explicitly excluded a 400-acre tract of
the 1,674 acres. The energy company attempted to
exercise its option and drilled a well within the 400
acres. The landowners then leased the 400-acre tract to
a second company. The energy company sued the
landowners for breach of contract, claiming a
reasonable interpretation included the 400-acre tract.
The energy company claimed up to any 1,210 acres of
the 1,674 acres of land described was in the option.
The court, however, disagreed with this interpretation
because the lease twice deemed the land around 1,210
in size, and the energy company paid for that exact
acreage. Furthermore, the referenced lease explicitly
exempts the 400 acres from the 1,674-acre tract. The
court decided the only reasonable interpretation was
that the option lease excluded the 400-acre tract, and
the energy company had no cause of action against
landowners because it had not yet exercised the option
agreement.

Pennsylvania
Sunrise Energy, LLC v. FirstEnergy Corp., 148 A.3d
894 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
A solar power generator (“Seller”) and electric
distribution company (“Buyer”) executed an
agreement under which the Buyer agreed to purchase
the Seller’s excess electricity. Later, the Buyer
terminated the agreement and refused to pay the
Seller, alleging that the Seller was not a “customergenerator” within the meaning of a state alternative
energy statute (“Act”). The Seller sued the Buyer on
contract claims and sought a declaration of its
“customer-generator” status. The Buyer filed
objections, arguing that the statue utility commission
(“Commission”) had exclusive jurisdiction over
questions concerning the Act. The trial court
dismissed the Buyer’s objections, reasoning it was
competent to resolve the case as a matter of statutory
construction. The Buyer appealed the jurisdictional
issue, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Buyer
argued that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
Federal

Illinois

9th Circuit

AUI Const. Grp., LLC v. Vaessen, 2016 IL App (2d)
160009.

All. for the Wild Rockies v. Christensen, No. 1435069, No. 14-35123 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016).

Property owners entered an agreement granting a
wind energy developer (“Developer”) an easement on
their property. Afterward, the developer entered an
agreement with a general contractor (“Contractor”) to
supply the wind turbine and tower. The contractor
manufactured wind turbines but entered a fixedpriced contract with a wind turbine company
(“Company”) to design a prototype tower to support
its wind turbines. The Company entered a cost-plus
agreement with a sub-contractor to build the
foundation and tower it designed. Once completed,
the sub-contractor billed an amount greater than $5
million. The Company paid in part, leaving a balance
of approximately $3 million. The sub-contractor filed
arbitration demand against the Company and the
arbitrator entered an award of approximately $3.5
million despite the Company filing for bankruptcy.
The sub-contractor filed to foreclose a mechanic’s
lien against the Owners for the work it performed for
the Company because its labor improved the
property. The owners filed a motion to dismiss the
sub-contractor’s complaint. The contractor filed a
motion for summary judgment on the subcontractor’s claims. Both motions asserted that the
wind turbines remained the Developer’s personal
property and constituted a non-lienable trade fixture
and not an improvement to the property. The trial
court, applying three factors from Crane Erectors &
Riggers, Inc. v. La Salle National Bank, 466 N.E. 2d
397 (1984) to determine whether equipment becomes
a lienable fixture, granted both motions concluding
that the turbines remained Developer’s personal
property and were unlienable. The sub-contractor
appealed, but the appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s application of Crane and other factors such as
the easement agreement that provided additional
evidentiary support that the turbines constructed by
sub-contractor remained personal property of the
Developer.

The United States Forest Service and the United
States Fish & Wildlife Service (collectively
“agencies”) initiated two projects in the Gallatin
National Forest. An activist group sued for an
injunction under the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”), claiming the agencies’ activities would
cause irreparable harm to the lynx and grizzly bear
populations in the area. The court held that the
agencies adequately considered the effects of road
density and helicopter logging; therefore, they did not
act arbitrarily or capriciously regarding the grizzly
bear issue. The agencies did not, however, use
specific location information on conducting the
research for the lynx, so the court upheld the
injunction on the agencies until they conducted
adequate research considering effects to the lynx
population.
State
Georgia
Nemchik v. Riggs, 792 S.E.2d 347 (Ga. 2016).
Lot 9 went through foreclosure and the plaintiff
bought it with the intent to develop it; the defendant,
however, claimed an easement on the property and
began clearing trees. The plaintiff sought an
injunction to prevent the defendant from entering the
property until the court could decide whether an
easement existed, which the court granted. The
defendants appealed, claiming the plaintiff failed to
show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
and that the defendant’s injury outweighed the
possible injury to the plaintiff—both necessary for an
injunction. On appeal, the court found that the
defendants offered no evidence of their easement,
losing the first point, and cleared trees causing
irreparable damage, losing the second point. The
court upheld the injunction.

Oklahoma
Calvert v. Swinford, 382 P.3d 1028 (Okla. 2016).
When landowners sold their property, not
intending to sell the minerals, they hired an attorney
and abstract company to make sure the transaction
went as planned. The deed sent to them to sign did
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not reserve the mineral rights, so landowners sent it
to the lawyer, who claimed to have fixed it. The
landowners never read the deeds filed in 2002, which
did not reserve mineral rights to the original owners.
In 2014, the landowners filed suit against the lawyer,
the royalty company, and the abstract company.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
because the claim was years past the statute of
limitations. Landowners contended that the statute of
limitations did not start with the filing of the deed but
when they first learned of the mistake in the deeds in
2013. Applying the discovery rule would allow the
statute of limitations to start in 2013, but the court
has only applied that rule in circumstances where
negligence was not discoverable to plaintiffs
exercising due diligence. The landowners were not
exercising due diligence as they did not take
advantage of the opportunity and obligation to read
the deed they signed. Therefore, the statute of
limitations accrued from the time of filing.

Pennsylvania
Balady Farms, LLC v. Paradise Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 148 A.3d 496 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
Farmer sought judicial review of a township
zoning board’s decision denying the farmer a zoning
permit for a poultry processing facility on his
property because the proposed facility did not fall
within the ordinance’s definition of “agriculture”
interpreted by the board. While the ordinance did not
expressly prohibit the farmer’s proposed facility, it
defined “agriculture” as “‘[a]n enterprise that is
actively engaged in the commercial production and
preparation . . . [of poultry] and [poultry] products.’”
But the ordinance did not define the words
“commercial,” “production,” or “preparation.” The
board based its conclusion that the definition of
“agriculture” does not include a commercial poultry
processing facility on the history of agriculture within
the township and comments by property owners
adjacent to the farmer’s property. To resolve the
dispute, the commonwealth court referenced the
ordinance that explicitly stated “[w]ords, phrases, and
terms not . . . defined shall be used in their ordinary
context’” and dictionary definitions and then
compared these facts to Tinicum Township v.
Nowicki, 99 A.3d 586 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). In
Tinicum, the Board denied a property owner a zoning
permit for an on-site mulching operation because the
mulch raw materials did not originate on the
property. Here, the court concluded that because the
farmer raised the chickens on the property, this
operation is distinguishable. Based on the State’s
Municipalities Planning Code defining agricultural
activities as “‘some connection to or utilization of the
land itself.’” Therefore, the proposed facility fell
within the definition of “agriculture” as used in the
ordinance.

Oregon
Martin v. Lane County, 383 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App.
2016).
A landowner filed a complaint for declaratory
ruling in circuit court over the correct zoning and
application of state law to a county’s zoning
ordinances. The land was in an “Agriculture,
Grazing, and Timber Raising” zone that had five-acre
minimum lot sizes. Then a county ordinance rezoned
the area as “Exclusive Farm Use” with a forty-acre
minimum lot size. The landowner attempted to build
and develop the land per its earlier zoning and lot
size but the county’s land management department
denied it. The county claimed that land use decisions
were the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Use
Board of Appeals of Oregon (“LUBA”). The court
found that the complaint did qualify as a land use
decision, and landowner could not bring a declaratory
judgment action on a question of interpretation of
County ordinance because it was under exclusive
jurisdiction of LUBA.
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